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Abstract
The Democratic Party (PD) is the only reasonably organized party in the Italian de-structured 
party system. It is itself undergoing a process of transformation. It defies all traditional party 
definitions. It is no longer a class-based mass party and not even a mass party. Nobody within 
the party believes that such a party can resurrect. It shows many features of a catch-all party, but 
some of them are by far more prominent than others. It is not simply an electoral-professional 
party since its aims go beyond just winning the elections and it relies more on internal resources 
than on outside professionals. At this point, the most appropriate definition is that of a person-
alist party cum factions. This article tries to explain : (1) how the PD has acquired a dominant 
position in Italian politics; (2) how its leader has been elected by members and sympathizers of 
the party; and (3) how much he is trying to transform the PD into a vehicle pursuing his per-
sonal ambitions. Much of what Matteo Renzi will achieve or fail to obtain depends on the new 
electoral law and on the opposition mounted by some actors, especially the Five Stars Move-
ment. The easiest forecast is that in the short-run the Italian party system will remain de-struc-
tured providing opportunities, but also volatility risks for the PD and its leader.
Keywords: Italy, party system, personalist party, leadership, primaries.
Resumen
El Partido Demócrata (PD) es el único partido razonablemente organizado en el desestructu-
rado sistema de partidos italiano. El propio PD está sufriendo un proceso de transformación 
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que desafía todas las definiciones tradicionales de partidos. Ya no es un partido de masas de 
clase y ni siquiera un partido de masas. Nadie dentro del partido cree que tal partido pueda 
resucitar. Muestra muchos rasgos de un partido «atrapa todos», pero algunos de ellos son 
mucho más prominentes que otros. No es simplemente un partido profesional-electoral ya que 
sus objetivos van más allá de ganar las elecciones y depende más de los recursos internos que de 
profesionales externos. En este momento, la definición más apropiada es la de un partido perso-
nalista con facciones. Este artículo trata de explicar (1) cómo el PD ha adquirido una posición 
dominante en la política italiana; (2) cómo han elegido los miembros y los simpatizantes del 
partido a su líder y (3) cómo este último está intentando transformar el PD en un vehículo para 
sus ambiciones personales. Gran parte de lo que Matteo Renzi obtenga o no depende de la 
nueva ley electoral y de la oposición organizada por algunos actores, en especial el Movimiento 
Cinco Estrellas. El pronóstico más fácil es que en el corto plazo el sistema de partidos italiano 
seguirá desestructurado brindando oportunidades, pero también riesgos de volatilidad para el 
PD y su líder.
Palabras clave: Italia, sistema de partidos, partido personalista, liderazgo, primarias.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of the only remaining party in 
Italian politics: the Democratic Party. Specifically, it will examine its organization, the 
procedures to choose the party leader and the candidates to elective offices and its pol-
icies with special reference to electoral and constitutional reforms. It does so in an 
attempt to predict the possible transformation of the party and its changed role within 
the Italian party system. The defeat in the December 4, 2016 constitutional referen-
dum, the February 2017 split of some dissenting sectors and the poor results in the 
June 2017 municipal elections have weakened the Democratic Party to an extent 
impossible to evaluate at this point in time. The future of the party will also depend 
on the type of electoral law that will finally be drafted.
ONE PARTY, MANY MODELS
Product of a “cold” (that is, not accompanied by much enthusiasm) merger 
between the Left Democrats (mostly former Communists) and the Daisy (mostly for-
mer Christian Democrats) (Bordandini et al., 2008; Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2010; 
Pasquino, 2013), the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) is a member of the Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats, the political group in the European Parliament of the Party 
of European Socialists (PES). Along the left/right political continuum, the PD is 
located in a center-left position. No longer a mass party as both its predecessors were 
up to their demise, the PD defies all attempts to be classified according to some classic 
political science categories. Though it exhibits the traits of at least four types of parties 
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–mass, catch-all, professional-electoral, personalist– on the whole it does not fit any of 
them in a fully satisfactory way. It is definitely not −and does not want to be− a mass 
party as characterized by Duverger (1954). It is not just a catch-all party as defined by 
Otto Kirchheimer (1966: 190), but most certainly it has gone through a) “a drastic 
reduction of ideological baggage” if it ever had one; b) it has proceeded to “a further 
strengthening of top leadership groups” (more on this below); c) it has accomplished 
“a downgrading of the role of the individual party member”, d) it has quietly accepted 
“a de-emphasis of the classe gardée” and, more generally, of all intermediate groups, 
“in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large”, and e) it has proceeded 
to “securing access to a variety of interest groups”, curiously less so to the trade unions. 
One way or another, all these features exist within the PD and characterize the evolu-
tion of the party.
Perhaps, today’s Democratic Party is best defined as a personalist party. According 
to the criteria specified by Kostadinova and Levitt, personalist parties are defined by: 
a) the presence of a dominant leader; b) a party “organization” that is weakly institu-
tionalized by design; and c) the “interactions between the leader and other politicians” 
are “driven mainly by loyalty to that leader rather than e.g., organizational rules, ide-
ological affinities, or programmatic commitments” (2014: 492). In this case, it is use-
ful to distinguish between a personalist, or personalized, party and a purely personal 
party (Calise, 2015). The former does not imply a total control of the leader on the 
party organization, whereas the latter suggests that the leader, given a specific combi-
nation of patrimonial and charismatic resources, is the owner of the party. Bluntly 
put, the PD cannot by any means become or be a personal party, that is, a political 
vehicle at the mercy of a single and unique leader. Nevertheless, it is quickly changing 
its structures in order to absorb the pressures coming both from its current leadership 
and, more in general, the mass media system (Bordignon, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
result of the constitutional referendum held on December 4 2016, which inevitably 
led to the resignation of Matteo Renzi as President of the Council, casts a new light 
on the possibility, entertained for a while by the leadership of the PD, to transform 
the party into a political vehicle in the hands of a single leader. The highly personal-
ized electoral campaign for the referendum carried out by Renzi himself and his clos-
est collaborators turned out to be a double-edged sword that interrupted (blocked?) 
prematurely the leadership of Matteo Renzi and, above all, his attempt to re-organize 
the party according to his own personal values, interests and, above all, ambitions.
As most parties of medium-large size in contemporary competitive democratic sys-
tems, on the whole the PD is a professional-electoral party. According to Panebianco’s 
(1988: 264) criteria, a professional-electoral party is characterized by: a) a central role 
of the professionals; b) weak vertical ties, appeal to the “opinion electorate”; c) pre-em-
inence of the elected representatives, personalized leadership; d) financing through 
interest groups and public funds; f) stress on issues and leadership, central role of the 
careerists and representatives of interest groups within the organization. Though not 
fully aware of all the implications of its transformation, the PD or, at least, its party 
secretary and Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and his exclusive (“magic”) circle of 
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collaborators stress their post-ideological, highly modern, future-oriented stances and 
policies without paying attention to the party organization nor investing energy 
and resources in its actual working. In several areas of Italy, the PD is in disarray or, 
simply, does not exist.
IN SEARCH OF AN ORGANIZATION
As said, since its inception, the PD has not paid any attention to its organization. 
The Daisy had practically retained no presence on the ground except where some 
powerful professional politicians had a personal electoral base. The Left Democrats 
could rely on some local structures especially, almost exclusively, in the so-called “Red 
Belt” (central regions of Italy) and in few urban areas in the North-West. That the 
organization of the party on the ground was fundamentally of no interest to the lead-
ers of the PD was immediately confirmed by Walter Veltroni’s summer campaign 
(2007) to win the office of party secretary. His entire platform was devoted to propos-
als to tackle and solve the socio-economic problems of Italy. What kind of party the 
new secretary would like to shape and lead was never discussed. Indeed, it was not part 
of Veltroni’s suggestive political narrative (Floridia, 2009). In different forms and 
Figure 1.
MeMbership oF the italian CoMMunist party (pCi, 1945-1990), the DeMoCratiC party 
oF the leFt or leFt DeMoCrats (1991-2006), the DeMoCratiC party (2007-2015), abso-
lute values
Legend: l = PCI, n = PDS/DS; s = PD.
Sources: own elaboration. Istituto Cattaneo (www.cattaneo.org); Partito Democratico (www.partitodemocratico.it); 
Pasquino (2013).
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degrees, all other secretaries of the party have shown the same reluctance to deal with 
the organizational structure of the party, especially at the local level. In particular, this 
tendency is rather evident if we observe the decline of party membership numbers, 
both in absolute and percentage terms. Looking at Figure 1, it is possible to compare 
the level of party membership of the PD with that of the Italian Communist (until 
1990) and post-Communist party (1991-2006). The downward trend, which is com-
mon throughout Western Europe (Poguntke et al., 2016; Van Biezen et al., 2012; 
Katz et al., 1992), is particularly evident in the case of the Partito Democratico, which 
can now count on less than 400,000 members. Even for the largest left-wing party in 
Italy, the golden age of mass politics and, accordingly, of mass-based parties is just a 
distant memory. On average, the current party membership of the PD accounts for 
something less than one-fourth of the total membership of the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI), whose heirs can be considered the main founders of the Democratic Party.
A similar trend emerges from the analysis of the membership/electoral ratio (ME), 
which is an indicator of the extent to which the party is anchored in society, that is, at 
the grassroots level. Up until the late 1980s, the mean party membership for the PCI 
as percentage of the national electorate was 5.1. With the creation of the PD, this fig-
ure has fallen to 0.8 %, which means that less than 1 % of the national electorate is a 
card-carrying member of the party. Again, this is a common trend elsewhere in 
Figure 2.
MeMbership oF the italian CoMMunist party (pCi, 1945-1990), the DeMoCratiC party 
oF the leFt or leFt DeMoCrats (1991-2006), the DeMoCratiC party (2007-2015) as per-
Centage oF the national eleCtorate
Legend: l = PCI, n = PDS/DS; s = PD.
Sources: Own elaboration. Istituto Cattaneo (www.cattaneo.org); Partito Democratico (www.partitodemocratico.it); 
Pasquino (2013).
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Europe, but the pace as well as the extent to which it actually took place in Italy, espe-
cially for the left-wing parties, are indeed unique.
As specified above, there are some exceptions to this trend, in particular if one 
observes the organizational strength and entrenchment of the party at the local/
regional level. As shown in table 1, in the central “red” regions of Italy (Emilia-Ro-
magna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche), the average ME ratio for the PD in 2013 is 
2.1 %, while in the rest of Italy the ratio falls to less than 0.8 %. These figures confirm 
two aspects. First, that the PD is mainly a geographically concentrated party, with a 
clearly uneven distribution of staff, members and resources throughout the entire 
nation. In a way, if the party elites aspire to build a real “Party of the Nation”, widely 
representative and evenly present on the Italian territory, eventually they should take 
table 1.
MeMbership oF the pD anD MeMbership ratio in 2012-2013
PD Membership 2012 Electorate 2013 PD Voters 2013 ME MV
Piemonte 19,244 3,439,197 643,863 0.6 3.0
Valle d’Aosta 112 100,277 18,191 0.1 0.6
Liguria 12,510 1,274,561 258,766 1.0 4.8
Lombardia 37,356 7,443,321 1,467,480 0.5 2.5
Trentino-Alto Adige 2105 777,135 101,216 0.3 2.1
Veneto 19,735 3,717,087 628,166 0.5 3.1
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 6091 964,045 178,001 0.6 3.4
Emilia-Romagna 82,098 3,338,137 989,810 2.5 8.3
Marche 11,743 1,197,752 256,886 1.0 4.6
Toscana 62,496 2,885,048 831,464 2.2 7.5
Umbria 16,671 683,834 168,726 2.4 9.9
Lazio 41,333 4,430,323 852,836 0.9 4.8
Campania 40,054 4,593,671 653,173 0.9 6.1
Abruzzo 10,129 1,067,298 175,857 0.9 5.8
Molise 1321 262,008 42,499 0.5 3.1
Puglia 15,110 3,297,793 407,279 0.5 3.7
Basilicata 6,384 476,020 79,631 1.3 8.0
Calabria 28,756 1,580,119 209,379 1.8 13.7
Sicilia 36,894 4,076,290 467,724 0.9 7.9
Sardegna 18,944 1,391,515 233,278 1.4 8.1
Total 469,086 46,995,431 8,664,225 0.9 5.4
Note: ME = membership as percentage of the national electorate; MV = membership as percentage of PD’s voters.
Sources: Own elaboration. Partito Democratico (www.partitodemocratico.it) and Ministry of Interior (www.
interno.gov.it).
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into account this (dismal) state of affairs. Second, the relatively enduring entrench-
ment of the party in the central regions of Italy proves a contrario that the organiza-
tional efforts, if any, of the party leaders to create a new, nationally widespread party 
structure, have essentially failed. Or, differently put, it means that the PD has not suc-
ceeded in inheriting and preserving the legacy of its predecessors and is moving toward 
a terra incognita of a new party model, which its leaders are not capable of imagining, 
defining and constructing.
Nonetheless, one significant innovation deserves both credit and a close analysis. 
According to art. 18 of the PD Statute all candidates to elective public office must be 
selected through primaries. The election of the party secretary himself/herself is 
entrusted not just to the party members, but to all those who sympathize with the par-
ty’s objectives and approve its platform. They will do so by signing a document (and 
donating some money) at the time of casting their vote.
Though still controversial, primary elections have been consistently resorted to by 
the Democratic Party even, to be precise, before the party came into existence. In 
October 2005, Romano Prodi was chosen to become the candidate to the office of 
Prime Minister of a coalition soon to be called Unione (The Union) through primary 
elections (Valbruzzi, 2015). At the time of our writing (October 2016) “regular” pri-
mary elections for mayors and presidents of the regions organized and held by the PD 
(or their immediate predecessors) have reached the quite impressive number of 1.039 
at the municipal level (Seddone and Valbruzzi, 2012; Venturino, 2016) and 17 at the 
regional level (De Luca and Rombi, 2016). Figure 3 reports the number of municipal 
primaries held in Italy since 2004. The overwhelming majority of these elections have 
been organized by the PD. As evident from the figures, the growth of primaries, espe-
cially at the local level, goes hand in hand with, first, the birth of the PD in 2007 (that 
Figure 3.
nuMber oF MuniCipal priMaries in italy, 2004-2016
Source: Candidate and Leader Selection (www.cals.it).
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has included this specific method of candidate selection in its Charter) and, second, 
the “wave” of municipal elections, which set the stage for the introduction of the pri-
maries at the local level.
The explosion of primary elections in Italy is thus the product of many, both sys-
temic and individual, factors (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2016). Nonetheless, it is a 
phenomenon that can be fully explained only by making reference to the idea, vaguely 
entertained by the major party leaders, to build up a so-called “party of the voters”, 
namely, a political organization in which members and voters share the same powers, 
rights and duties. This was the party model briefly sketched in the Statute of the party, 
but repeatedly challenged by the old guard of the PD. So far it has remained just a 
project on paper.
The initial idea entailed the creation of what Susan Scarrow (2014) has recently 
defined as a “multi-speed membership party”, that is, an organization “that seeks to bol-
ster traditional membership while at the same time creating new affiliation options for 
supporters who may or may not eventually acquire traditional membership” (Ibid.: 
128). The co-existence of old-style party membership with new types of “light”, more or 
less sporadic, partisan affiliation (e.g., voting in primary elections or for the national 
or regional leadership, but not performing any other task) was meant to be the distin-
guishing mark of the party model described in the Statute of the PD. Nevertheless, it has 
been consistently and constantly challenged by the minority groups within the party, 
which have been stuck with the idea of the party as a sort of cleavage community, that 
must control and preserve the boundaries of the organization. If the “party of the voters” 
model entails a high level of permeability of the organizational boundaries, the alterna-
tive “community model” supported by the internal opposition emphasizes the exclusive 
right of their members. The unwillingness, perhaps, the inability to face and solve this 
major “contradiction” condemns the party to frequent internal clashes and to some 
external (in the eyes of the voters) weaknesses. In fact, the clash between these two party 
models, that to some extent convey alternative visions of the Left and target different 
electoral constituencies, will probably be at the center of the next party convention and 
decide the fate and the organizational nature of the PD. Needless to add, no one in the 
Democratic Party looks back to the golden age of mass parties even though, of course, 
many remember ‘their’ class-based mass party and others recall their confessional mass 
party (Kirchheimer, 1966). Neither can be revived.
A MULTI-SPEED MEMBERSHIP PARTY?
To a certain extent, all episodes of intra-party competition that have so far taken 
place within the Partito Democratico were based on these two different narratives of 
party legitimacy. On the one hand, one finds the type of party model promoted by 
Veltroni and Renzi. It can be defined as a purely election-oriented vote-seeking polit-
ical party, according to which the voters, not the members, are the organizational bot-
tom line. On the other hand, there lingers the “cleavage representation party”, 
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supported by Bersani and much of the old guard of the PD, which has “well-defined 
notions of the group interest to which members are expected to defer” (Scarrow, 
2014: 23). The clash between these two visions of party model suggests that the PD 
has not yet reached a sufficient level of institutionalization and the basic rules of the 
game are not fully accepted by all groups within the party. What is more, this situa-
tion is not going to change as long as one of the two visions will permanently defeat, 
and prevail over, the other.
As to the selection of the party secretaries (see table 2), there have been three instances 
to date: Veltroni in 2007 (Pasquino, 2009); Pier Luigi Bersani in 2008 (Pasquino and 
Venturino, 2010; Valbruzzi, 2015); Matteo Renzi in 2013 (Pasquino and Venturino, 
2014). In a way, all three elections have been preceded or followed by traumatic events. 
Veltroni’s victory proved to be just one additional factor in the prolonged crisis of 
Romano Prodi’s second unfortunate experience in the government (2006-2008). 
Almost inevitably, the secretary of the PD, as it had occurred in numerous occasions 
within the Christian Democratic party, somewhat felt to be and, in any case, was largely 
considered the successor designate of the incumbent Prime Minister. Veltroni’s electoral 
and political strategy in the subsequent 2008 national elections led to what was consid-
ered a clear defeat, inevitably followed by his quick abrupt resignation. More complex 
was not so much Bersani’s election to the office of party secretary, but his later designa-
tion to the office of Prime Minister at the end of 2012 (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2013).
table 2.
leaDers oF the DeMoCratiC party, 2007-2017




































































Sources: Own elaboration. Democratic Party (www.partitodemocratico.it) and Pasquino (2013). Legend: * = the 
direct election of the Pd leadership was held on 30 April 2017.
Even though the PD’s Statute/Charter is crystal-clear, that is, the party secretary is 
consequentially and automatically the party’s candidate to the office of Prime 
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Minister, there appeared a challenger: Matteo Renzi, the young newly elected mayor 
of Florence. Out of a combination of political generosity and of an understandable 
evaluation of the mobilizational benefits of an open competition, Bersani asked for 
and, obviously obtained, an ad hoc temporary derogation from the Charter. In a five- 
candidate field/race Bersani did not garner an absolute majority of votes (44.9 %) and 
Renzi did much better than expected (35.5 %). Out of 3,110,210 votes cast, Bersani 
gained only 291,000 votes more than Renzi. In a way, the lack of an absolute majority 
and the relatively small lead justified yet another exception to the party’s rules. A run-
off was held between Bersani and Renzi sanctioning Bersani’s victory (60.9 %), but 
also highlighting the impressive performance by Renzi (39.1 %). There lingered in the 
Democratic electorate at large a not so much subterranean dissatisfaction with the rul-
ing group, the old guard of the party. Thanks to a mix of populist discourse and 
anti-political rhetoric, Renzi’s determination to challenge the old guard and his prom-
ise to proceed to its scrapping (rottamazione), as if it were an old car, was substan-
tially rewarded.
Though all this was very interesting and, to our knowledge, unprecedented in 
European parliamentary democracies, it may have come to nothing had Bersani not 
led a very lackluster electoral campaign for the 2013 national elections. Too much 
complacent in his role of front-runner, Bersani did not offer any new policy, but fun-
damentally more of the same and much of the same of what the previous non-partisan 
government led by the Professor of Economics Mario Monti (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 
2012) had offered, but not delivered, in any case encountering several serious criti-
cisms. The surge of the Five Star Movement (Tronconi, 2015; Corbetta and Gualmini, 
2013; Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013) and the technicalities of a poorly drafted elec-
toral law did the rest. Having barely obtained more votes than the Five Stars Move-
ment, but thanks to a sizable bonus of seats, the PD enjoyed a comfortable 
parliamentary majority in the Chamber of Deputies, though not a majority in the 
Senate (ITANES, 2013). Refusing to appoint Bersani unless he could guarantee to 
win a vote of confidence in both houses, the President of the Republic Giorgio Napoli-
tano practically put an end to Bersani’s political career and, more or less knowingly 
and deliberately, opened a new phase in the tormented life of the Democratic Party 
(Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2013).
Bersani’s inevitable resignation led to yet another contest for the office of party 
secretary. On December 8, 2013, in a three-person race Renzi obtained a crushing 
victory (67.7 %). The 22nd of February, 2014, President Napolitano appointed Renzi 
to replace a sort of Grand Coalition government led by PD Enrico Letta that had 
lasted less than a year. Renzi became the youngest Prime Minister in the history of the 
Italian Republic and the first to be at the same time the leader of his party and not a 
member of Parliament. Since then, the story of the Democratic Party and, perhaps, its 
destiny have been fully interwoven with what Renzi’s government has done and not 
done, does and will do. A turning point not to be underestimated, though already 
considered far away in the past, was represented by the 2014 elections of the European 
Parliament. Unexpectedly, perhaps just a felicitous instance of a honeymoon with the 
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electorate, the Democratic Party won 40.8 % of the votes (see table 3), more than any 
other European party (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2014). In Italy, in national elections, 
only the Christian Democrats had ever overcome the 40 % threshold. Not without 
some reason, Renzi’s interpreted this outcome as a personal success. More precisely, 
the European elections proved, on the one hand, that Renzi had a significant personal 
appeal, or backing, that goes much beyond that of his party; on the other hand, that 
the PD under his new galvanizing leadership was in fact capable of attracting voters 
from other parties, especially center (Civic Choice, Union of the Centre) and right-
wing parties (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia).
table. 3.
pD eleCtoral results, 2001-2014
Legislative 
elections (no. 





and % of votes)
Seats
(no. and %)



































Sources: Own elaboration. Ministry of the Interior (http://elezionistorico.interno.it) and Pasquino (2013).
Subsequent, especially local elections have somewhat downsized the electoral 
strength of the PD and, in particular, the attractiveness of its new leadership. How-
ever, following the European elections Renzi seems to have acted as if the party he is 
leading is more of a hindrance than an instrument to be used to govern and to trans-
form the country because his personal appeal and approval ratings (see figure 4) have 
constantly transcended the borders of the party’s political confines and electoral 
capabilities.
By all means, since his “popular” election to secretary of the PD, Renzi has been 
in full control of his party because the National Assembly reflects in its composition 
the percentages obtained by the three candidates. More precisely, as table 4 shows, 
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Renzi received 65.8 % of the votes, whereas Cuperlo managed 20.5  % and Civati 
14.2 %. These figures make clear that the Secretary had a stronger appeal among the 
voters at large rather than the “regular” activists of the party. His sort of anti-establish-
ment message, centered on the idea of the so-called “scrapping” of the old(er) party 
elite, made him the perfect candidate to attract votes from a wider audience made up 
of light, “irregular” members or sympathizers plus those who were beginning their 
“electoral” story in those years.
Slightly less uneven is Renzi’s control of the party on the ground where there were 
major waves of allegiance transfers from the old guard to the new rulers. As a conse-
quence, while some dissent may still appear here and there, one cannot find true 
“rebellions”, that is, cases and contexts in which local parties have openly opposed the 
party line or openly criticized the party secretary. Renzi’s sore points have been 
the Chamber and, even more so, the Senate parliamentary groups. Because of the elec-
toral law, party lists are closed, that is, all candidates have been elected following their 
ranking on the lists. Obviously, being party secretary at the time of the drafting of the 
lists of candidates, Bersani with his collaborators exercised a strong/decisive influence 
in the appointment and ranking of the candidates even though several so called “par-
liamentary primaries” were held (Regalia and Valbruzzi, 2016). Moreover, practically 
all the Democrats who entered the Chamber of Deputies and many who entered the 
Senate because of the majority bonus owed their seat to Bersani’s benevolence. Only 
Figure 4.
renzi’s governMent approval rating, June 2014-oCtober 2016 (perCentage values)
Note: Question “On a scale of 1-10, how would you rate Renzi’s government?”. The figures report the percentage of 
respondents rating Renzi’s government favorably (that is, with a value greater than or equal to 6). Survey conducted 
from October, 24 to October 27, 2016 through a combined CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing), 
CAMI (Computer Assisted Mobile Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) method. The 
sample (N = 1.213) is representative of the overall Italian electorate. The margin of error of ± 2.8%.
Source: Demos and Pi (http://www.demos.it/a01315.php?ref=HREC1-9). For more details, see Diamanti (2016).
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apparently, has Renzi had hard time in obtaining the support of the Democratic par-
liamentarians. Among the Democratic parliamentarians, the process of “reposition-
ing” started very soon and has already gone very far.
It is true that few deputies and senators have decided to leave the PD parliamen-
tary group (among them Civati who has launched a political movement called “Possi-
bile”, clearly referring to Podemos), but other deputies and senators, coming, for 
instance, from the Five Star Movement, have joined the PD parliamentary groups. 
table 4.
results oF the 2013 DireCt leaDership eleCtion (% values)
Regions Matteo Renzi Gianni Cuperlo Giuseppe Civati
Valle d’Aosta 64.2 15.2 20.6
Piemonte 70.2 14.1 15.7
Lombardia 67.8 14.9 17.3
Liguria 62.8 19.5 17.7
North-west regions 67.6 15.3 17.1
Trentino-Alto Adige 67.5 13.8 18.7
Veneto 68.8 14.9 16.3
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 66.2 17.9 15.9
Emilia-Romagna 71.6 14.9 13.5
North-east regions 69.5 15.2 15.3
Toscana 77.4 12.3 10.3
Marche 76.2 10.7 13.1
Umbria 73.6 16.1 10.3
Lazio 65.5 21.2 13.3
Abruzzo 67.4 20.1 12.5
Central regions 74.0 14.5 11.5
Molise 62.1 29.6 8.3
Puglia 60.3 24.5 15.2
Basilicata 58.3 33.7 8.0
Campania 60.7 30.8 8.5
Calabria 58.4 33.3 8.3
Southern regions 61.6 27.2 11.2
Sicilia 61.3 27.4 11.3
Sardegna 55.6 25.4 19.0
Islands 59.4 26.7 13.9
Total Italy 65.8 20.5 13.7
Source: Valbruzzi (2015: 99).
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But what really counts is that none of the dissenting Democratic parliamentarians has 
prevented the government from obtaining what Renzi firmly desired and imposed. Of 
course, half of the 463 laws approved between March 15, 2013 and June 15, 2016 
have been approved because of a strict enforcement of party discipline, but not even 
on the constitutional reforms and the electoral law the so-called minorities of the PD 
have either attempted or succeeded in disrupting the course of the government.
ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Repeatedly, Renzi has claimed that his government’s raison d’être is to make the 
constitutional reforms (and, subordinately, to revise the electoral law). He has gone so 
far as to stress that the reform of the Constitution is the mandate given to him by for-
mer President Giorgio Napolitano. A close analysis of the process of the reforms that 
have been formulated and approved, and of the referendum campaign launched and 
personally conducted by Renzi can reveal a lot concerning the Democratic Party, its 
political role, its leadership, its future (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2017; Pritoni et 
al., 2017).
According to article 138 of the Italian Constitution, all constitutional revisions, if 
not approved by a parliamentary majority of two thirds, may be (but do not have to 
be) submitted to a referendum provided one fifth of the parliamentarians or five 
regional councils or five hundred thousand voters request it. From the very beginning 
and at all times they felt it necessary, Renzi and his Minister of Institutional Reforms 
stressed that, in any case, the government was going to call a referendum. From the 
very beginning and for several months up to the end of August 2016, Renzi vehe-
mently stressed that if “his” reforms will not be confirmed by the voters, he would 
resign and leave political life so that a serious political crisis would follow. It was only 
after some criticisms of his plebiscitarian posture/blackmail reached the ears of espe-
cially President Napolitano who suggested that the Prime Minister had probably 
exceeded in his personal politicization/political personalization of the referendum, 
that Renzi has somewhat receded from his propaganda statements (taken too seriously 
by foreign economic operators and major economic newspapers). Despite his delayed 
attempts to progressively deactivate the plebiscitarian threat, the Italian voters used 
the constitutional referendum also to express their evaluation of the performance 
of the Prime Minister and their disapproval of his policies.
In any case, for many voters the issue had already irreversibly become personal-
ized. A Yes vote meant supporting Renzi and his government; a No vote implied also 
the rejection of Renzi and his government. As shown in figure 5, the majority of vot-
ers counter-reacted to the personalized campaign conducted by the PD leader by 
adopting a similar personalized logic of voting. More precisely, according to the opin-
ion of the electorate, from both sides of the confrontation, six voters out of ten used 
the referendum as an instrument to either keep in or kick out of office the incum-
bents. Inevitably, the most immediate consequence of the referendum result was, as 
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indicated above, the resignation of Renzi’s cabinet and then the overt contestation of 
his leadership within the Democratic Party. A circumstance that, for the moment, has 
put a brake on Renzi’s ambitions to transform the party into his own personal politi-
cal vehicle.
Figure 5.
the Meaning oF the Constitutional reFerenDuM aCCorDing to the italian eleCtor-
ate (% values)
Note: Question: ‘According to you, Italian voters will express their vote on the constitutional referendum on the basis 
of…’. Survey conducted in two waves (October and November 2016) through a combined CATI (Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing), CAMI (Computer Assisted Mobile Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer Assisted Web 
Interviewing) method. The sample (N = 2,400) is representative of the overall Italian electorate. The margin of error 
of ± 2.8%.
Source: Bordignon, Ceccarini and Diamanti (2017: 141).
The referendum strategy had never been discussed in the National Assembly of 
the Democratic Party, but the message sent to the “minorities” within the PD was 
very simple and precise: they were asked not only to vote Yes to the reforms, but also 
to organize Committees in support of those reforms. The new political class of the 
Democrats would emerge and be recruited from those committees and on the basis of 
their commitment. A promise or a threat that were made credible by the existing elec-
toral law and its closed lists of parliamentary candidates.
The reform of the electoral law was originally drafted in collaboration with Berlus-
coni whose electoral law, used in 2006, 2008, and 2013, had been declared unconsti-
tutional by the Constitutional Court. The so-called Italicum shares many features 
with the previous electoral law (and, in fact, has met the same electoral fate of its pre-
decessor, being partially rejected by the Constitutional Court), but for our purposes, 
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that is, understanding and explaining the role and the goal of the Democratic Party, 
one feature and one mechanism have an overriding importance (Pasquino, 2015). 
The feature is that, on condition that their party has won enough votes, the heads of 
the party lists in the one hundred constituencies are automatically elected. The Itali-
cum was a proportional law, but accompanied (made less proportional and, in more 
than one way, distorted) by a majority bonus. This is the mechanism that clearly dif-
ferentiated it from the previous electoral law and that, for a variety of reasons, has 
been recently judged unconstitutional by the Court. If no party gets 40 % plus one 
votes there will be a run-off between the two most voted parties. The winner will 
obtain 340 seats (out of 630) in the Chamber of Deputies, thus enjoying a sizable, 
though artificial, parliamentary majority allowing it to govern without any need to 
form a coalition. Pre-electoral coalitions and apparentements between the first round 
and the run-off were forbidden.
Berlusconi accepted the mechanism of the run-off when it still appeared possible 
that his party could obtain enough votes to be the second Italian party. Since the 
approval of the law and after several municipal elections, not only do all the data sug-
gest that the Five Stars Movement is solidly behind the PD, but that in a run-off it 
may even obtain enough votes to defeat Renzi’s party. Hence, after having repeatedly 
declared that the Italicum is an excellent electoral law for which many European sys-
tems prove admiration and envy and that they will soon imitate, a bizarre situation has 
followed. In order to avoid a likely victory by the anti-establishment and surely catch-
all Five Star Movement, how to reform the reform, that is, an electoral law not yet 
utilized and already changed or corrected by the Constitutional Court, has become 
the new game in town.
The main reason behind the idea of a sizable seat bonus to the winning party is to 
assure the governability that, according to the proponents, litigious Italian coalitions 
have not been able to provide. Renzi’s paramount goal was and remains that of obtain-
ing a single party parliamentary majority, possibly made exclusively of loyal support-
ers, allowing him to govern alone. Throughout the discussion of the electoral law and 
the constitutional reforms, the project of a new, though never fully designed, party 
appeared: the Party of the Nation.
A NEW PARTY FOR THE NATION
Since 19941, the Italian party system has been in disarray (Morlino, 1996; Pas-
quino and Valbruzzi, 2015). Despite some occasional attempts at creating viable par-
ties on the left and on the right of the political continuum, overall the party system 
has remained virtually destructured (fluid, in flux) as all the indicators clearly suggest 
1. We take as a cut-off point the date of the national elections held with a new largely majoritarian 
electoral law.
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and confirm. New parties have appeared, old parties have declined and all parties have 
undergone major transformations. Technically, Italy has witnessed a prolonged phase 
of party de-alignment with no end in sight. The re-alignment, that is, a restructuring of 
the classic patterns of competition and of stable competitors is still in the making, but 
it appears highly unlikely. In this perspective, the so-called Party of the Nation, the 
final step in the process of change, adjustment and adaptation of the Democratic 
Party seems to be more part of the problem (de-alignment) than part of the solution 
(realignment) if the other parties are unable to reorganize and reshape themselves. 
Moreover, out of a deep electoral and political discontent with the existing parties and 
party system and, to some extent, with the political system those parties have created 
and rarely governed satisfactorily, a new, highly significant competitor has emerged. 
Rejecting the term “party”, the Five Star Movement has irrupted into the bipolar 
competition and has disrupted the political alignment (Russo, 2015). Exploiting a 
high level of electoral volatility/volubility, the movement created by the comedian 
Beppe Grillo has quickly become the true and feared challenger of the Democratic 
Party. So much so that all the polls indicate the likelihood not only of a run-off 
between the PD and the Five Star Movement, but (as of September 2016) a victory of 
the latter (see figure 6). Not so much incidentally, this dismal electoral trend for the 
Figure 6.
voting intentions in the hypothetiCal run-oFF eleCtion between DeMoCratiC party 
(pD) anD Five star MoveMent (M5s), 2016 (perCentage values)
Note: Question “In case of run-off election between PD and M5S, which party would you vote for?”. Survey con-
ducted from October, 24 to October 27, 2016 through a combined CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview-
ing), CAMI (Computer Assisted Mobile Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) method. 
The sample (N = 1.213) is representative of the overall Italian electorate. The margin of error of ± 2.8%.
Source: Demos and Pi (http://www.demos.it/a01315.php?ref=HREC1-9). For more details, see Diamanti (2016).
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PD explains why Renzi decided to set up a new internal committee with the aim of 
changing the new, though not yet utilized, electoral law.
In order to understand and appreciate how the PD has reacted, it is important to 
explain the impact and the consequences of two events and developments. The first 
one has to do with the absolute necessity to reform the existing electoral law whose 
several features have been declared unconstitutional by a sentence of the Constitu-
tional Court n. 1/2014. The second event is to be considered at the same time a short-
term reaction to the political situation and a not fully thought-through strategy.
In Italy more than elsewhere, with the likely exception of France, reforms of the 
electoral law have been drafted in a highly partisan manner in order to redefine political 
parties, electoral coalitions, the overall party system. This was also the case of the 1993 
electoral law dubbed Mattarellum because its rapporteur was Sergio Mattarella (since 
2015 President of the Italian Republic). Indeed, the transition from a PR law to a law 
in which three fourths of the parliamentarians had to be elected in single-member con-
stituencies produced not only a bipolar competition, but, for the first time in Italian 
history, put the premises of that precious, until then unachieved, outcome that is rep-
resented by alternation in the government (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2011). Also, it 
obliged Italian parties to coalesce and granted small parties a significant coalitional/
blackmail power (Sartori, 1976) because in single-member constituencies their votes 
could, and often did, make a difference. Thus, the electoral law drafted by Renzi and 
initially accepted by Berlusconi was also meant to reduce, even, if at all possible, to 
eliminate the small parties’ blackmail power (for the most significant technicalities, see 
Pasquino, 2015). But the requirement introduced in the 2014 law e.g. that, for a party 
to win the majority bonus, it must obtain 40 % of the votes plus one, means that both 
Renzi and Berlusconi will be obliged to find some allies well before the vote.2
Those who had given birth to the Partito Democratico and, before them, some of 
the participants in the umbrella organization called Ulivo (Olive Tree), had enter-
tained the idea of shaping a party with a majoritarian vocation. Incidentally, appar-
ently unknown to most of them, the same vocation/aspiration was formulated several 
decades before by Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party. The 
majoritarian vocation consists of two components. The first one, much too simple, 
was that the party aimed at obtaining the highest possible number of votes (vote-seek-
ing) getting rid of any ideological baggage whatsoever that might negatively impinge 
on its electoral appeal. The second, less simple, but clear component was that the 
party had to declare itself unwilling to join any coalition, because it wanted to run 
alone without being encumbered by small greedy parties. This is exactly what the first 
2. This requirement (run-off voting), as well as the possibility for the top candidates standing 
in multiple constituencies to freely choose his/her favourite election constituency, have been 
struck down by the decision of the Constitutional Court issued on January, 25. In doing so, 
the Court sent a powerful message to Parliament to draft laws more respectful of the need to 
provide good representation to the Italian voters.
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Secretary of the Partito Democratico, Walter Veltroni, did in the 2008 elections. He 
won a very high percentage of votes (33.1 %, see table 3), though still less than Enrico 
Berlinguer’s PCI in 1976, but was resoundingly defeated by Berlusconi’s political 
vehicle, at the time called Popolo della Libertà.
In a subtle, or just improvised way, the idea of yet a party with a majoritarian voca-
tion made its reappearance in the circles around Prime Minister Renzi. In particular, 
this idea was vaguely inspired by the work of Maurice Duverger (1954) on the organ-
ization and strength of political parties. According to the French scholar, three types 
of parties can be distinguished on the basis of their electoral strength: minor parties, 
major parties and parties with a majority bent. The latter category applies to those 
parties “which command an absolute majority in parliament or are likely to be able to 
command one at some date in the normal play of institutions” (Duverger, 1954: 284). 
More precisely, for this majoritarian party, which is the norm in two-party systems 
and can also make their appearance in moderate or bipolar party systems, “it is likely 
at some date to have to shoulder alone the responsibilities of government” (ibid.). 
This idea of a party with a majority bent, especially in the highly fragmented context 
of the Italian party system, was mostly misinterpreted and forgot by the founders of 
the Partito Democratico. A “majority bent” does not imply the necessity nor the capa-
bility for a party to represent the whole nation. It simply means that there exists a party 
which finds itself in the position to control, for a more or less limited period of time, 
a majority of seats in parliament and, in the light of this, is willing to govern alone.
By contrast, the idea, the “emotional” label, the prospect of becoming a party truly 
representing the entire Nation, though mission impossible, was entertained, cherished 
and widely exhibited. Never mind that some, however few, commentators pointed to 
the important historical experience of Italian Christian Democracy that, though in 
fact largely representing the “nation”, was always quite open and willing to reach, 
include, and reward the political allies. Never mind, too, that the “occupation” of the 
center of the Italian political spectrum by the DC has prevented the occurrence of any 
alternation in government, mainly for international reasons. Never mind, finally, that, 
indeed, power corrupts and that the DC had ended in collapse. Born to provide a via-
ble alternative to Berlusconi and his recurrent conquest of political power and pro-
longed governmental rule, the PD, at least, its secretary, his collaborators and several 
political commentators were willing to run all the risks entailed in the transformation 
leading to the Party of the Nation and its subsequent attempt to govern the country, 
presumably not severely challenged by any competitor.
Even though the PD in Parliament has accepted and “rewarded” the votes by par-
liamentarians elected in the ranks of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the project for a Party 
of the Nation has made little headway so far. It has ultimately remained a project on 
paper or in the mind of the party elite, but it has found virtually no response among 
citizens and voters. As table 5 makes evident, the PD is still the favorite party for 
those citizens who identify themselves as left-wing voters. Renzi’s PD appeal to 
non-leftist voters is rather limited and approximately only one-third of its potential 
electorate comes from centrist and right-wing citizens. From this perspective, the truly 
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“national” political party in Italy is not Renzi’s PD but, interestingly enough, Beppe 
Grillo’s Five Star Movement, whose actual and potential electorate is quite homoge-
neously distributed throughout the entire political spectrum, including also those vot-
ers that reject the twentieth-century left-right dimension of competition.
table 5.
voters’ leFt/right selF-plaCeMent by voting intentions, 2015 (% values)
Voter’s self-placement Partito Democratico Five Star Movement Overall electorate
Left 70.9 36.3 41.3
Center 16.4 27.3 18.1
Right 9.2 20.8 32.0
Neither left nor right 3.5 15.6 8.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Survey conducted from November, 16 to November 24, 2015 through a combined CATI (Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing) and CAMI (Computer Assisted Mobile Interviewing) method. The sample (N = 1.522) is 
representative of the overall Italian electorate. Confidence level at 95% with a margin of error of ± 2.5%. For more 
details, see Emanuele and Maggini (2015: 1).
Source: Own elaboration.
The June 2016 local elections, characterized by the poor and quite disappointing 
results of the PD candidates and lists (Morini e Pritoni, 2016), dealt a major, but not 
necessarily decisive blow to the idea/project of the Party of the Nation. In any case, no 
lesson was learned. No attempt has been made so far to reorganize the party along nei-
ther well-known traditional criteria nor new criteria. Launching his campaign on the 
referendum concerning constitutional reforms , the secretary of the party stated that 
the new Democratic Party “ruling” class would emerge from the “Committees for the 
Yes vote”, probably in an attempt to appeal to outside ambitious women and men rather 
than (re)mobilize PD activists. In spite of repeatedly making reference to some reforms 
–the job market, the educational system, the incomplete restructuring of the Italian 
bureaucracy–, the PD cannot be characterized as a policy-seeking party. The vote-seek-
ing nature of the party and, in particular, the office-seeking attitude of its single-minded 
elite completely obfuscated the programmatic orientation of the PD. If a policy-seeking 
party is defined by the fact that it gives absolute priority to its policies (Wolinetz, 2002), 
there is no doubt that Renzi’s PD falls outside this conceptual category. Hence, we have 
decided not to devote any specific consideration to the few reforms the party has passed 
and whose fruits are quite controversial and still in the making.
CONCLUSION: PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
Notwithstanding the opposition from a few weak internal factions, there can be 
no doubt that the Italian Democratic Party is today almost exactly, what its secretary, 
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Matteo Renzi, wants it to be. As long as Renzi was also the Prime Minister of Italy, 
the party organization as such enjoyed practically no autonomy from the government 
and its policies. Few exceptional moments and instances aside, the Democratic Party 
local power holders work as a transmission belt of what the PD does in the govern-
ment. Though too many Italians often boast that their country is either a laboratory 
in which political and institutional transformations start or which anticipates events 
that will take place in other parliamentary democracies, what is occurring in the Par-
tito Democratico can be explained with reference both to an old, but revered, model 
and to a new, rather widespread, phenomenon. By all standards, the Partito Democra-
tico is more than anything else a catch-all party of the type identified by Kirchheimer, 
more precisely a vote and office-seeking political instrument. All the catch-all features 
characterize its structure, its leadership, its policies. Moreover, the Partito Democratico 
also fits especially well among the personalist parties that have appeared in many con-
temporary democratic regimes. To some extent, the PD is also trying to construct a 
multi-speed membership organization, which combines, in different forms and 
degrees, the constant commitment to the party activities by “old” militants with the 
more erratic engagement of new “light members” or sympathizers. However, as we 
have stressed throughout this article, there is no established, widely accepted, overar-
ching model for the PD. To date, the Democratic Party remains a party made up of 
many models, oftentimes in contradiction with one another. This wealth of models, 
platforms and projects is not an indicator of party strength, but reveals the uncertainty 
and the persistent inability to endow the party with a stable structure. To some extent, 
this state of affairs within the PD is also a function of the whole Italian party system 
still stuck in a never-ending political and institutional transition. As long as the Italian 
transition will not find a more stable anchorage, the Democratic Party too will be at 
the mercy of different and contradictory incentives. It is still too early to assess both the 
validity and durability of this experiment in party engineering, but the evidence 
collected thus far shows that the survival of the PD will rest on very shaky grounds 
unless a coherent party model prevails over the alternative models.
AFTERMATH
Two major events have significantly affected the Democratic Party between 
December 2016 and May 2017. Having invested much of his political prestige and 
reformist aura on the referendum on constitutional reforms, to the point that the ref-
erendum had almost become a plebiscite on his person, Matteo Renzi immediately 
resigned from Prime Minister and party secretary following the crushing defeat on 
December 4, 2016. Soon afterwards a new government was formed led by Democrat 
Paolo Gentiloni, who only replaced a couple of ministers but has run the government 
in total continuity with the previous one. For his part, Renzi and his collaborators 
launched the procedures to elect the new secretary for the Partito Democratico looking 
for a political comeback and in an attempt to regain full control of the party. The 
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reconquista became even more important after months and months of quarrels and 
clashes (and defeats), when some sectors of the Democratic Party, led by former Sec-
retary Pier Luigi Bersani, decided to leave the PD (February 2017). It is impossible to 
evaluate how much has this split affected the PD. In any case, Renzi went on and eas-
ily won the re-election as secretary with slightly less than 70 % of the votes. When the 
PD lost badly the June 2017 local elections, several voices within and around the party 
made themselves heard criticizing Renzi’s leadership style, substance, strategy. Both 
the PD and several left-wing groups “circulating” around it appear not well positioned 
on their way to the February/March 2018 national elections. The Italian Left and the 
Democratic Party may not (yet) be in disarray, but their future is not promising, either.
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